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Abstract—The increasing extreme weather events poses un-
precedented challenges on power system operation because of
their uncertain and sequential impacts on power systems. This
paper proposes the concept of an extended steady-state security
region (ESSR), and resilience enhancement for transmission
systems based on ESSR in consideration of uncertain vary-
ing topology changes caused by the extreme weather events
is implemented. ESSR is a ploytope describing a region, in
which the operating points are within the operating constraints.
In consideration of uncertain varying topology changes with
ESSR, the resilience enhancement problem is built as a bilevel
programming optimization model, in which the system operators
deploy the optimal strategy against the most threatening scenario
caused by the extreme weather events. To avoid the curse of
dimensionality with regard to system topologies for a large-scale
system, the Monte Carlo method is used to generate uncertain
system topologies, and a recursive McCormick envelope-based
approach is proposed to connect generated system topologies to
optimization variables. KarushKuhnTucker (KKT) conditions are
used to transform the sub-optimization model in the second level
into a group of equivalent constraints in the first level. A simple
test system and IEEE 118-bus system are used to validate the
proposed.
Index Terms—Bilevel programming, extended steady-state se-
curity region, resilience, transmission systems
NOMENCLATURE
Indices and Sets
b, b′ Index of terminal buses of a line.
g Index of generators.
k Index of sequential system topology scenarios.
l Index of lines.
t Index of time periods.
Gb Set of units at power bus b.
Bb Set of power buses connected to power bus b.
L Set of lines that are in failure states for all
sequential system topology scenarios.
L¯ Set of lines that are not in failure states for all
sequential system topology scenarios.
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Πk Set of system topologies from the first decision
time period to the last decision time period for
the kth sequential system topology scenario.
Ψ1,Ψ2,ΨK Different extended steady-state security region.
Ω Set of all possible ESSRs corresponding to all
sequential system topology scenarios.
Parameters
a,A,b,B,C Coefficient matrices based on operational con-
straints.
Bbb′ Electrical susceptance.
M A large number.
P bb′ Upper active power capacities of line b− b′.
P bt Load at bus b in the time period t.
P g, P g Lower and upper active power limits of gener-
ator g.
Rg, Rg Ramp-up and ramp-down limits of generator u.
θb, θb Limits of voltage angle at bus b.
Variables
Pgt, Pg(t+1) Active power of generator g at t and t + 1,
respectively.
Pbb′tk Active power through line b − b′ in the time
period t under the sequential system topology
scenario k.
θbtk Phase angle of bus b in the time period t under
the sequential system topology scenario k.
ubb′tk Binary variable to indicate the state of line b−b′
in the time period t under the sequential system
topology scenario k. ‘1’ and ‘0’ denote on-state
and off-state, respectively.
U Binary variable vector representing different
system topology.
Y Continuous variable vector representing system
operating conditions.
Y∗ Optimal value of the suboptimization model.
s+,s− Vectors of positive slack variables.
(s+)∗, (s−)∗ Optimal values of the suboptimization model.
L Lagrangian funtion.
f, F Optimization objective functions.
α, β, γ Lagrange multiplier vectors.
αˆ, βˆ, γˆ Lagrange multiplier diagonal matrices corre-
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2sponding to α, β, γ, respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
EXTREME weather events with higher frequency andheavy intensity have great impacts on power system oper-
ation [1], [2]. The countermeasures against possible extreme
weather events are usually not included in the conventional
operational strategies. Many organizations, e.g., the United
States National Research Council (NRC) [3], the House of
Lords in the United Kingdom [4], the North American Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC) [5], [6], and the United States
Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) [7], have already
emphasized the importance of resilient operational strategies
against extreme weather events.
According to the framework of power system resilience,
the strategies should be prepared in three stages of an extreme
weather event, i.e., prior to the event, during the event, and
after the event [3], [6]. Prior to the event, it is necessary
to perform preventive strategies and assessments to enhance
the system capacity of stay standing or keeping operating in
the face of disasters. To assess the possible outages caused
by hurricanes, the regression models based on historical data
are established [8]–[10]. In addition, the impacts of wildfires
and extreme floods on power systems are analyzed [11],
[12]. With the assessments, some preventive strategies, e.g.,
pre-hurricane restoration planning, network hardening, mobile
energy storage pre-allocation, and microgrid construction, are
investigated to increase the system capacity of stay standing
in the face of extreme weather events. For example, [13]
proposed a proactive resource allocation model in consider-
ation of restoration and repair for potential failures of devices
located on the path of an upcoming hurricane. [14] presented
conservative schedules for microgrids in consideration of the
minimum number of vulnerable lines in service on the path
of an approaching hurricane. [15] proposed a tri-level optimal
hardening strategy to enhance the resilience of power distri-
bution networks to protect against extreme weather events.
[16] presented a model for resilient routing and scheduling
of mobile power sources, which are pre-positioned to enable
rapid pre-restoration for high survivability of critical loads.
During the event, it is necessary to perform real-time strategies
to enhance the system capacity of managing the impacts as it
unfolds. [17] presented an operational enhancement approach,
which includes the assessment of the impact of severe weather
events on power systems and a risk-based defensive islanding
algorithm. The developed islanding algorithm can avoid the
potential cascading failures during extreme weather events.
[18] developed a microgrid sectionalization method, which
divides an interconnected system into several microgrids, to
improve distribution system resilience. [19] proposed an inte-
grated resilience response framework that links the preventive
strategies and the real-time strategies, which include generator
dispatch, topology switching and load shedding. [20] proposed
a resilience-constrained unit commitment (RCUC) model in
consideration of system operational constraints, heterogeneity
of power flow distribution, and lines forced outages. [21] pro-
posed a Markov-based operation strategy to enhance system
resilience during an unfolding extreme event. The possible
sequential system topologies are modeled as Markov states, by
which a recursive value function is developed with operation
constraints and intertemporal constraints. After the event, it
is necessary to perform restoration strategies to recover the
system to a normal operating condition as quickly as possible.
Microgrid construction is one of effective methods to restore
loads quickly after disasters. [22] proposed a distribution
system operational approach by constructing multiple mi-
crogrids with distributed generators to restore critical loads
from the power outage. In consideration of the scarcity of
power generation resources, [23] employed the concept of
continuous operating time (COT) to determine the availability
of microgrids to evaluate the service time and in consequence
to restore critical load by using a chance-constrained model.
To avoid subsequent outages, [24] presented the formation of
adaptive multi-microgrids with mobile emergency resources
as part of the critical service restoration strategy. After disas-
ters, appropriately dispatching repair crews and mobile power
sources can accelerate the load restoration. [25] proposed a
resilient scheme for disaster recovery logistics to co-optimize
distribution system restoration in consideration of dispatching
repair crews and mobile power sources by using a mixed
integer linear programming.
Based on the literature review, most of research studies
focused on system hardening, mobile emergency resource
allocation/dispatch, microgrid construction, and repair crew
dispatch to enhance power system resilience for distribu-
tion systems. For transmission systems, the effects of these
strategies are limited due to different characteristics between
distribution systems and transmission systems. In practice,
a proper operating point when an extreme weather event
impacts the transmission systems is critical in consideration
of operational constraints, e.g., ramping rates of generators,
output limits of generators, and system transmission capacity.
An inappropriate operating point may need to perform load
shedding in face of uncertain sequential system topologies
on the trajectory of an weather-related event in consideration
of the limits of operational constraints. Therefore, this paper
focuses on the investigation of the operating point for the
transmission system to enhance the system resilience against
the extreme weather event. The contributions of this paper are
listed as follows: 1) The concept of an extended steady-state
security region is proposed; 2) Base on the extended steady-
state security region, resilience enhancement in consideration
of uncertain varying topology changes caused by the extreme
weather events is implemented; 3) Resilience enhancement
is constructed as a bilevel programming optimization model,
with which an optimal operating point against the threatening
scenarios caused by the sequential weather event.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II shows the extended steady-state security region during an
unfolding event. Section III presents the bilevel optimization
model of resilience enhancement and the solution method. The
case studies are demonstrated in Section IV, and the work is
concluded in Section V.
II. EXTENDED STEADY-STATE SECURITY REGION DURING
AN UNFOLDING EVENT
A. Extended Steady-state Security Region
Due to the sequential time periods of an unfolding weather
event, different transmission lines might be in failure in
different time periods, and in consequence result in different
topologies in different time periods. For example, the set of
failure components in the time periods t1 and t2 may be{b12} and {b12, b14}, respectively. This indicates that the
line b12 is out of service in t1 and t2, and the line b14 is
out of service in t2. Due to the uncertain impacts of the
unfolding event on the system, the possible failure components
may have different scenarios, e.g., {b12} and {b12, b16} in
t1 and t2, respectively. For all of these possible scenarios,
the system operators expect feasible operating points in each
decision period. However, the operating points over sequential
time periods are determined by operational constraints, e.g.,
generators’ ramping rates, thermal capacity limits of lines, and
generators’ capacity limits. An appropriate operating point in
the time period t0 play an important role in the subsequent
3operating points. We use the steady-state security region (SSR)
[26] to illustrate the importance of the operating point.
b2
b1
b3
b5
b6
b4
G1 t0
t1
t2
b7
G3
Typhoon Trajectory
t3
G2
Fig. 1. An example of components’ failure scenarios during an unfolding
event
The SSR is defined as a multi-dimensional space with the
set of injected power as axes, where the operational constraints
work as boundaries. Based on SSR, it is easy to check whether
an operating condition is steady-state secure. Take the scenario
in Fig. 2 as example, in which there are two generators. The
operating conditions o1, o4, and o6 at time t0 are steady-
state secure. Usually, SSR is constructed to deal with one
time period. However, in the practical system, strategies are
usually needed over sequential time periods. When considering
the impacts of sequential time periods, the scenarios will be
different. For example, o1 can reach o2, and then can reach o3
in consideration of the generators’ ramp-rates in t1, t2, and t3,
respectively. However, o4 can only reach the red rectangular
region in t2, where the corresponding operating region is not
within SSR in t2. Similarly, o7 can only reach the red rectan-
gular region in t3, where the corresponding operating region
is not within SSR in t3. From the above cases, we conclude
that the impacts of the sequential strategies in different time
periods should be included. Therefore, an extended steady-
state security region (ESSR) is proposed based on SSR.
P1
P2
t
SR at t0 SR at t1
SR at t2
o1
o2
o3
o4
o5
o6
o7
o8
Fig. 2. An example of security region (SR) on a sequential timeline
SSR is assumed to be expressed as follows.
ψ= {y|a · y ≤ b} (1)
where y is the variable vector, in which generators’ outputs
are included, and a and b are coefficient matrices representing
operating constraints. Based on (1), ESSR can be expressed
as follows.
Ψ= {Y|A ·Y ≤ B} (2a)
Y = [yT1 , · · · ,yTt · · · ,yTN ]T (2b)
B = [bT1 , · · · ,bTt · · · ,bTN ]T (2c)
A =

a1 a12
a21 a2
. . .
aN−1 aN−1,N
aN,N−1 aN
 (2d)
where Y is the variable vector, in which generators’ outputs in
different time periods are included, and A and B are coeffi-
cient matrices representing operating constraints in different
time periods. a12 and a21 represent the coupling relations
between the first time period and the second time period, and
they correspond to the generators’ ramp-rates.
B. ESSR with Uncertain Varying Topology Changes
ESSR addresses the issue of sequential characteristics of
strategies on the system, i.e, the sequential impacts of extreme
weather events on the system. However, the uncertain impacts
of extreme weather events on the system should be also
included. Take the scenario in Fig. 3 as an example, and
we illustrate the 3-dimension figure by means of three 2-
dimension figures to read them easily. Fig. 3 (a), (b), and
(c) represent the regions in t0, t1, and t2, respectively. When
considering the strategy in t0, the system topology in the future
time periods t1 and t2 cannot be determined because the lines
may be out of service due to extreme weather events, and
this results in different possible ESSRs. When dispatching the
system in t0, it is desired to get a strategy, which can reach
the feasible region in t1 and t2 in consideration of different
possible ESSRs. Therefore, we define a new set Ω that include
all possible ESSRs, and it is expressed as follows.
Ω = {Ψ1,Ψ2, · · · ,ΨK} (3)
where Ψ1, Ψ2, and ΨK are different ESSRs that correspond to
different sequential system topologies Π1 = {pi11, · · · , pi1N},
Π2 = {pi21, · · · , pi2N}, and ΠK = {piK1, · · · , piKN}. piKN
is a system topology scenario of the Kth ESSR at time N .
The sequential system topologies Π1, Π2, and ΠK can be
generated stochastically by using the Monte Carlo method
based on failure probability due to the extreme weather events
[27]–[29] for a large scale system.
P1
P2
t
SR at t1 SR at t2
SR at t3
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P2
P1
P2
P1
P2
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 3. Extended Security region (ESR) illustrated by three 2-dimension
figures
4III. BILEVEL OPTIMIZATION MODEL OF RESILIENCE
ENHANCEMENT
This section first presents the mathematical formulation of
ESSR in consideration of with uncertain varying topology
changes, and then the bilevel optimization model is developed.
A. Formulation of ESSR
For a given sequential system topology Πk, we can list its
corresponding ESSR as follows.∑
g∈Gb
Pgt − Pbt +
∑
b′∈Bb
Pbb′t = 0 ∀b, t (4a)
Bbb′(θbt − θb′t) = Pbb′t ∀(b, b′) ∈ ΠK , t (4b)
P bb′ ≤ Pbb′t ≤ P bb′ ∀(b, b′) ∈ ΠK , t (4c)
Rg ≤ Pg(t+1) − Pgt ≤ Rg ∀g, t (4d)
P g ≤ Pgt ≤ P g ∀g, t (4e)
θb ≤ θbt ≤ θb ∀b, t (4f)
where (4a) shows the power balance constraint, (4b) presents
the physical relations between voltage angles and power flows
through lines, (4c) is the power limit of lines, (4d) is the limit
of generators’ ramp-rates, (4e) shows the limit of generators’
outputs, and (4f) is the voltage limit. To make topology
changes easily embedded in the model, Pbb′t is represented
as an explicit function with regard to the voltage angles θb
and θ′b but not the injected power. (4) can be expressed as a
generic form as follows.
∃Y : A ·Y ≤ B (5)
The physical meaning is that there exist a strategy satisfying
the operating constraints for a given ESSR. To find a strategy,
we can construct a new optimization model by introducing
positive slack vectors s+ and s−.
f(Y) = min
Y,s+,s−
1T s+ + 1T s− (6a)
s.t. A ·Y + s+ − s− ≤ B (6b)
s+ ≥ 0, s− ≥ 0 (6c)
where 1 and 0 are vectors that consist of 1 and 0 with proper
dimensions, respectively. When having f(Y) = 0, we can
conclude Y 6= ∅. If f(Y) > 0, it indicates that no strategy
can satisfy the operating constraints, i.e, Y = ∅. Therefore,
we can conclude that the necessary and sufficient condition
for Y 6= ∅ is f(Y) = 0.
B. Formulation of ESSR with uncertain varying topology
changes
An extreme weather event may lead to different system
topologies on its trajectory. When considering possible topol-
ogy changes, ESSR can be represented as follows.∑
g∈Gb
Pgt − Pbt +
∑
b′∈Bb
Pbb′tk = 0 ∀b, t, k (7a)
Bbb′(θbtk − θb′tk) = Pbb′tk ∀(b, b′) ∈ Πk, t, k (7b)
P bb′ ≤ Pbb′tk ≤ P bb′ ∀(b, b′) ∈ Πk, t, k (7c)
Rg ≤ Pg(t+1) − Pgt ≤ Rg ∀g, t (7d)
P g ≤ Pgt ≤ P g ∀g, t (7e)
θb ≤ θbtk ≤ θb ∀b, t, k (7f)
where (7a)-(7f) include the possible topology changes by
introducing the topology scenario notation k. Even though
(7a)-(7f) are directly related to the system topologies, they
cannot be optimized directly because they are not explicit
models with regards to optimization variables. To relate opti-
mization variables, we reformulate the model by introducing
integer variables that represent on-off states of lines and in
consequence represent the system topologies.∑
g∈Gb
Pgt − Pbt +
∑
b′∈Bb
Pbb′tk = 0 ∀b, t, k (8a)
Bbb′(θbtk − θb′tk)− Pbb′tk + (1− ubb′tk)M ≥ 0
∀(b, b′) ∈ l, l ∈ L, t (8b)
Bbb′(θbtk − θb′tk)− Pbb′tk − (1− ubb′tk)M ≤ 0
∀(b, b′) ∈ l, l ∈ L, t (8c)
ubb′tkP bb′ ≤ Pbb′tk ≤ ubb′tkP bb′ ∀(b, b′) ∈ l, l ∈ L, t (8d)
Bbb′(θbtk − θb′tk) = Pbb′tk ∀(b, b′) ∈ l, l ∈ L, t, k (8e)
P bb′ ≤ Pbb′tk ≤ P bb′ ∀(b, b′) ∈ l, l ∈ L, t, k (8f)
Rg ≤ Pg(t+1) − Pgt ≤ Rg ∀g, t (8g)
P g ≤ Pgt ≤ P g ∀g, t (8h)
θb ≤ θbtk ≤ θb ∀b, t, k (8i)
where (8b)-(8d) represent the constraints with regards to
the lines that are impacted by the extreme weather event.
ubb′tk ∀(b, b′) ∈ l, l ∈ L, t can cover all system topologies
in all possible EESRs. In practice, a large scale system will
suffer from curse of dimensionality with regard to system
topologies, but some system topologies caused by the extreme
weather event happen with a very small probability. To avoid
curse of dimensionality, the uncertain system topologies with
very small probabilities can be ignored. To this end, we can
use Monte Carlo to generate system topology scenarios. To
include the generated system topology scenarios as variables
in the model, the additional constraints should be included.
We use an example to explain this. We have three lines
l1, l2, and l3. There will be 23 = 8 topology scenarios if
we consider all scenarios, and all topology scenarios can be
represented by binary variables x1, x2, and x3, which represent
the states of three lines. In practice, we may just need to
consider some topology scenarios, e.g., the topology scenarios
{x1, x2, x3} ∈ {{1, 1, 1}, {0, 1, 1}}. ‘1’ and ‘0’ represent the
on-state and off-state of the lines, respectively. To model these
two topology scenarios in the model, we introduce two binary
variables z1 and z2 to represent selection of scenarios. z1 = 1
denotes selection of the scenario {1, 1, 1}, and z2 = 1 denotes
selection of the scenario {0, 1, 1}. In this case, the constraints
with regard to the topology scenarios can be expressed as
follows.
z1 = x1x2x3 (9a)
z2 = (1− x1)x2x3 (9b)
z1 + z2 = 1 (9c)
z1, z2, x1, x2, x3 ∈ {0, 1} (9d)
where (9a) and (9b) represent the relations between the sce-
nario selection and the line states. (9c) denotes that only one
scenario can be selected. The multilinear constraint (9a) can
be represented as linear constraints by using the McCormick
5envelope method with new binary variables α = x1x2 as
follows.
α ≥ x1 + x2 − 1, α ≤ x1, α ≤ x2 (10a)
z1 ≥ α+ x3 − 1, z1 ≤ α, z1 ≤ x3 (10b)
where (10a) and (10b) are equivalent to (9a) because all
variables in (9a), (10a), and (10b) are binary.
Similarly, the multilinear constraints (9b) can be repre-
sented, with new binary variables β = (1−x1)x2, as follows.
β ≥ −x1 + x2, β ≤ 1− x1, β ≤ x2 (11a)
z2 ≥ β + x3 − 1, z2 ≤ β, z2 ≤ x3 (11b)
Based on the above example, we can write a generic form.
zk =
∏
(b,b′)∈l,l∈L,t
(1− 2rbb′tk)(1− ubb′tk − rbb′tk) ∀k
(12a)∑
k
zk = 1 (12b)
where rbb′tk is a known value that corresponds to the element
of {{1, 1, 1}, {0, 1, 1}}, and zk and ubb′tk are binary variables.
The multilinear functions in (12a) is represented as a group
of linear constraints by means of a recursive procedure with
the McCormick envelope method. In (12a), the multilinear
function with all binary variables is u1u2 · · ·uS , in which the
subscript S is the number of binary variables for one Ψk.
u1u2 · · ·uS can be expressed by introducing binary variables
ζ2, ζ3, · · · , ζS as follows.
ζ2 = u1u2
ζ3 = ζ2u3· · ·
ζS = ζS−1uS
(13)
With the McCormick envelope method, (13) can be equivalent
to the following constraints.
ζ2 ≥ u2 + u1 − 1
ζ2 ≤ u1
ζi ≥ 0 (i = 2, · · · , S)
ζi ≤ ui (i = 2, · · · , S)
ζi ≥ ui + ζi−1 − 1 (i = 3, · · · , S)
ζi ≤ ζi−1 (i = 3, · · · , S)
(14)
Associated with (12b)-(14), the optimization model (8), can
be expressed as a generic form as follows.
∀U, ∃Y : A ·Y +C ·U ≤ B (15)
where U denotes the vector of binary variables in the model.
Y is the vector of continuous variables representing operating
conditions. A, B, and C are the matrices corresponding to
coefficients in the constraints (8a)-(8i). The physical meaning
of (8) is that there is a strategy satisfying the operating
constraints for all ESSRs. Based on the optimization (6), we
can model the problem as follows.
F (Y) = min
Y,s+,s−
1T · s+ + 1T · s− (16a)
s.t. ∀U, ∃Y, s+ ≥ 0, s− ≥ 0 (16b)
A ·Y +C ·U+ s+ − s− ≤ B (16c)
where the optimization model (16) is to find a strategy
that satisfies the worst-case scenario. Therefore, (16) can be
rewritten as a linear max-min optimization model.
F (Y) = max
U
min
Y,s+,s−
1T · s+ + 1T · s− (17a)
s.t. A ·Y +C ·U+ s+ − s− ≤ B (17b)
s+ ≥ 0, s− ≥ 0 (17c)
where (17) can be further reformulated as a bilevel optimiza-
tion model as follows.
F (Y) = max
U
1T · (s+)∗ + 1T · (s−)∗ (18a)
s.t. min
Y,s+,s−
1T · s+ + 1T · s− (18b)
s.t. A ·Y +C ·U+ s+ − s− ≤ B (18c)
s+ ≥ 0 (18d)
s− ≥ 0 (18e)
where (s+)∗ and (s−)∗ are the optimal solutions of the sub-
optimization model (18b)-(18d).
C. Solution
Because the sub-optimization model (18b)-(18e) is the
constraint of the main model, it is not easy to solve the
model directly. The sub-optimization model (18b)-(18e) can
be equivalent to several inequality constraints and equality
constraints by using KarushKuhnTucker (KKT) conditions
with new variable vectors α, β and γ corresponding to (18c),
(18d), and (18e), respectively. The lagrangian corresponding
to the sub-optimization model (18b)-(18e) can be expressed
as follows.
L = 1T s+ + 1T s−+
αT (AY +CU+ s+ − s− −B)−
βT s+ − γT s−
(19)
Based on the lagrangian, Y∗, (s+)∗, and (s−)∗ of the sub-
optimization model (18b)-(18e) satisfy the KKT conditions
that are be expressed as follows.
∂L
∂Y
= AT · α = 0 (20a)
∂L
∂s+
= 1+ α− β = 0 (20b)
∂L
∂s−
= 1− α− γ = 0 (20c)
A ·Y∗ +C ·U+ (s+)∗ − (s−)∗ −B ≤ 0 (20d)
− (s+)∗ ≤ 0 (20e)
− (s−)∗ ≤ 0 (20f)
α ≥ 0 (20g)
β ≥ 0 (20h)
γ ≥ 0 (20i)
αˆ · (A ·Y∗ +C ·U+ (s+)∗ − (s−)∗ −B) = 0 (20j)
βˆ · (s+)∗ = 0 (20k)
γˆ · (s−)∗ = 0 (20l)
where αˆ, βˆ, and γˆ are diagonal matrices corresponding to the
vectors α, β, and γ, respectively.
6Based on the equivalent constraints, the optimization model
can be expressed as
max
U,Y∗,(s+)∗,(s−)∗
1T · (s+)∗ + 1T · (s−)∗ (21a)
s.t. (20a)− (20l) (21b)
where (21) is a mixed integer linear programming model,
which can be solved by the solvers like CPLEX and Gurobi. If
the maximum value of the model (21) is not 0, it indicates that
load shedding should be performed to ensure the existence of
feasible operating points satisfying generated topology scenar-
ios in each time period. If the maximum value of the model
(21) is 0, there exist operating points without load shedding in
each time period, which satisfy generated topology scenarios
due to the extreme weather event. With the extended steady-
state security region-based model, we can find an optiaml
strategy to enhance the system resilience against the extreme
weather event.
IV. CASE STUDIES
Two test systems, a simple system and a revised IEEE 118-
bus system, are employed to verify the proposed model and
the algorithm. The cases are tested in MATLAB 2017a using
CPLEX 12.6 on a computer with 3.1 GHz i7 processors and
16 GB RAMS.
A. Case 1: A Simple System
This simple system is used to illustrate the proposed model
with detailed results. The system topology and the typhnoon
trajectory are shown in Fig. 1. There are three generators
G1, G2, and G3, which are connected to the buses b2, b5,
and b7, respectively. Loads connected to the buses b1, b3,
b4, and b6 are 0.4, 0.4, 0.6, and 0.6 (p.u.), respectively. The
lower/upper limits of each generator are 0.2 (p.u.) and 2.5
(p.u.), respectively. As shown in Fig. 1, there are four decision
epoches on the typhnoon trajectory. In t1 and t2, the system
is directly impacted by the typhnoon. Even though the system
is not directly impacted by the typhnoon in t0, the dispatch
strategy in t0 has impacts on the following dispatch strategies
in t1 and t2 due to the operational constraints, the generators’
ramping rates, and possible topology changes caused by the
typhnoon. Therefore, we focus on the dispatch strategies in t0,
t1, and t2.
TABLE I
LINE DATA
No. From Bus To Bus Line Capacity (p.u.)
1 1 2 0.65
2 1 4 0.65
3 1 6 0.65
4 2 3 0.9
5 3 5 0.9
6 4 5 0.8
7 4 6 0.8
8 6 7 0.9
9 3 7 0.9
When making decisions in t0, the possible topology changes
in t1 and t2 should be considered, i.e., the extended steady-
state security region should be included. Table II shows the
possible topology changes in t1 and t2. The red regions in
Fig. 4 (a) and (b) are the feasible dispatch regions in t0
with the generators’ ramping rates 0.15 (p.u.) and 0.35 (p.u.),
respectively. It is observed that the higher generators’ ramping
rates have a larger feasible dispatch region. The point A
corresponds to PG1 = 0.62, PG2 = 0.70, and PG3 = 0.68
TABLE II
COMPONENT FAILURE SCENARIOS
No. Component Failure
t1 t2
1 - -
2 - b1-b4
3 - b1-b6
4 - b1-b4, b1-b6
5 b1-b2 -
6 b1-b2 b1-b4
7 b1-b2 b1-b6
8 b1-b2 b1-b4, b1-b6
9 b1-b4 -
10 b1-b4 b1-b6
11 b1-b2, b1-b4 -
12 b1-b2, b1-b4 b1-b6
in t0, and this point is within the feasible dispatch region
when the generators’ ramping rates are 0.15 (p.u.). Fig. 5 (a)
and (b) show the scenarios of line power flow with possible
system topologies caused by the typhnoon in t1 and t2. All
scenarios are within the limits. The point B corresponds to
PG1 = 0.62, PG2 = 0.90, and PG3 = 0.48 in t0, and this point
is beyond the feasible dispatch region when the generators’
ramping rates are 0.15 (p.u.). Table III lists line power flow
with the component failure scenario 5. The power flow through
the 6th line reaches the limit under the optimal strategy in t1
with the loss of load 0.015 (p.u.) at bus b4. The point C has the
same generators’ outputs with the point B, but it is within the
feasible dispatch region when the generators’ ramping rates
are 0.35 (p.u.). Fig. 6 (a) and (b) show the corresponding
scenarios of line power flow with possible system topologies
caused by the typhnoon in t1 and t2, and all scenarios are
within the limits. Higher generators’ ramping rates indicates
faster adjustment abilities of the system under the operating
conditions.
Different system parameters also have impacts on the feasi-
ble dispatch regions. The generators’ ramping rates are set to
0.15 (p.u.). Fig. 7 (a), (b), and (c) show the feasible dispatch
regions in t0 with different capacities of the line b4-b5, i.e.,
0.7, 0.8, 0.9, respectively. It is observed that a larger capacity
limit can lead to a larger feasible dispatch region under the
same adjustment ability of the system. In practice, the system
operators can dispatch the system to the feasible dispatch
region to decrease the potential damages. For example, the
system operators can dispatch the system to the red region in
t0, i.e., the decision period before a typhnoon hits the power
system, to enhance system resilience against the typhnoon.
TABLE III
COMPONENT FAILURE SCENARIOS
No. Line Power Flow
t1 t2
1 - 0.5238
2 0.2050 -
3 0.1950 0.1238
4 0.6050 0.2312
5 0.0900 0.0345
6 0.8000 0.5255
7 0.0100 0.0745
8 0.7850 0.5507
9 0.1150 0.1343
B. Case 2: IEEE 118-bus System
The IEEE 118-bus System and the trajectory of the typhoon
are shown in Fig. 8. The ramping rates of all generators
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Fig. 4. Feasible dispatch region in t0 with ramping rates 0.15 p.u. (a) and
0.35 p.u. (b).
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Fig. 5. Power flow with ramping rate 0.15 (p.u.).
are assumed to 0.25. The failure probability of the line on
the trajectory of the typhoon is assumed to 0.05. There are
numerous uncertain topologies on the typhoon trajectory, and
it is difficult to list all uncertain topologies on the typhoon
trajectory because of curse of dimensionality with regard to
system topologies. In addition, some uncertain topologies on
the typhoon trajectory happen with a very small probability.
Therefore, the Monte Carlo method is used to generate the
topology scenarios. Fig. 9 (a), (b), (c), and (d) show feasible
operating points at time t0 when having 200, 600, 1000,
and 1400 topology scenarios, respectively. It is observed that
generation outputs have the similar profiles when considering
more topology scenarios such as 1000 topology scenarios
and 1400 topology scenarios. The similar profiles indicate
that the extended steady-state security region based on the
topology scenario generation method can approximate the
original extended steady-state security region based on all
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Fig. 7. Feasible dispatch regions in t0 with different line capacities 0.7 (a),
0.8 (b), 0.9 (c), respectively.
uncertain topology scenarios. For a large system in practice,
the system operators first generate enough topology scenarios
by using the Monte Carlo method, and then dispatch the
system to the feasible dispatch region to against the typhnoon.
8Load Bus Generator Bus 
Typhoon Trajectory
t1
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t4 t5
t0
t6
Fig. 8. IEEE 118-bus system topology.
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Fig. 9. Generation profile with different topology scenarios.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes an extended steady-state security region
(ESSR), by which resilient strategies in consideration of
uncertain varying topology changes caused by the extreme
weather events can be implemented. The physical meaning
for the ESSR-based resilient strategy is to find a strategy sat-
isfying the operating constraints in consideration of uncertain
varying topology changes. To model this problem, a bilevel
optimization model that finds a strategy satisfying the worst-
case scenario is established, in which the sub-optimization
model in the second level is transformed into the equivalent
constraints that are included in the the first level of the
model. To address the curse of dimensionality with regard to
system topologies for a large-scale system, the Monte Carlo
method is used to generate uncertain system topologies, and a
McCormick envelope-based approach is proposed to connect
generated system topologies to optimization variables. Two
test systems are used to validate the proposed model. The
detailed results are illustrated in the first test system, in which
it is concluded that ESSR-based enhancement strategies are
impacted by operating limits such as generators’ ramping rates
and line thermal capacity limits. The second test system shows
the reasonability of the generated system topologies in a large-
scale system.
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